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INTRODUCTION 
So-called patent trolls are widely recognized as a pesky problem within the 
domain of patent law.1  Also known as patent assertion entities (“PAEs”), patent 
trolls are the legal owners or licensees of patents who, rather than practice or 
license their patented inventions, exist chiefly to “sue, or collect money by 
threatening to sue, companies for infringing the patents they own.”2 
 
*J.D. 2020, Marquette University Law School.  Thank you to the staff of the MARQUETTE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW for their diligent work on this piece.  I also thank the numer-
ous friends, colleagues, and mentors who contributed to this piece in various ways.  And last but cer-
tainly not least, thank you to my loving wife Ashley, whose enduring support and patience has made 
all of my achievements possible.  All errors are my own. 
1.  See Dennis Crouch, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 14, 2013), http://pa-
tentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/chien-patent-trolls.html [https://perma.cc/GM36-CX6J]. 
2. Sylvia Hsieh, Will Obama’s Proposals Rein in Patent Trolls?, LAWYERS USA (June 6, 
2013), 
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While PAEs are not always of the harassing and unsavory variety, this com-
ment focuses on those undesirable PAEs that seek to assert patent rights in a 
harassing manner.3  In this context, PAEs assert patent rights4 via a patent no-
tification letter that threatens an expensive patent infringement suit if the ac-
cused infringers do not settle with the PAEs for the alleged infringement, where 
the settlement sum demanded is modest enough to force accused infringers into 
settlement but large enough to inflict great financial burden to the alleged in-
fringers.5  For smaller businesses, the problem becomes even more pronounced 
by unfamiliarity with patent law.6  In the absence of any meaningful federal 
legislative response to PAEs,7 states have enacted legislation of their own, what 
I call “anti-PAE statutes,” in an effort to ward off patent trolls and protect their 
constituents.8 
In this comment, I use Wis. Stat. Ann. § 100.197 (“Wisconsin’s anti-PAE 
statute”)9 to demonstrate the significant degree to which the Federal Circuit’s 
current preemption regime restricts states’ abilities to regulate the behavior of 
PAEs.  In Part II, I summarize Wisconsin’s legislative response to PAEs.10  In 
Part III, I contrast the Federal Circuit’s preemption doctrine and the Supreme 
Court’s doctrine as it relates to state laws similar to anti-PAE statutes.11  Paying 
particular attention to Wisconsin’s patent notification statute, I provide a brief 
preemption analysis in Part IV.12  Finally, in Part V, I conclude by arguing that 
the severe consequences of the Federal Circuit’s standard, as demonstrated by 
its likely preemptive effect on Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute, highlight the need 
 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1366733294/fulltext/E2EA66DA3FA84109PQ/1?accountid=10
0 [https://perma.cc/5NLF-EUAL]. 
3. Charlotte R. Lane, The International Trolling Commission, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-international-trolling-commissionthe-international-trolling-com-
mission-1381181344 [https://perma.cc/S2QW-RM4L]. 
4. Some suggest that the patents asserted by PAEs are often of “low quality and dubious valid-
ity.”  See 157 CONG. REC. 717 (2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“Patents of low quality and dubious 
validity, by contrast, enable patent trolls and constitute a drag on innovation.  Too many dubious pa-
tents also unjustly cast doubt on truly high-quality patents.”). 
5. PAEs like MPHJ serve as a representative example.  See, e.g., State Actions on Patent Trolls, 
N.Y. ST. SCI. & TECH. L. CTR., http://nysstlc.syr.edu/state-actions-on-patent-trolls/ 
[https://perma.cc/2UUL-FUDM] (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
6. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 387, 400 (2014). 
7. David Lee Johnson, Facing Down the Trolls: States Stumble on the Bridge to Patent-Asser-
tion Regulation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2023, 2053–54 (2014). 
8. Infra Part II. 
9. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197 (West 2018). 
10. See infra Part II. 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
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for the emergence of the Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in the context 
of state laws touching on patents.13 
I.  THE STATE’S EFFORTS TO WARD OFF PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES 
In 2013, Vermont became the first state to make a legislative effort to ward 
off PAEs.14  Vermont’s anti-PAE statute creates a civil cause of action for re-
cipients of demand letters that assert patent rights in bad faith.15  Following 
Vermont’s lead, at least thirty other states have passed some form of anti-PAE 
statutes.16  Some states regulate PAEs’ trolling behavior by prohibiting any bad 
faith assertions of patent rights,17 while others limit the applicability of the stat-
ute to only those assertions made by non-practicing entities.18  Some states only 
permit the state attorney general to bring suit against the bad faith patent 
holder,19 rather than create a private cause of action. 
A.  Wisconsin’s Anti-PAE Statute 
In 2014, Wisconsin enacted its own anti-PAE statute20 to prevent Wiscon-
sin businesses from being “extorted by . .. . . patent troll[s]” and ensure that tar-
gets of infringement letters can make “informed decision[s]” regarding patent 
 
13. See infra Part V. 
14. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2014); Eric Goldman, Vermont Enacts the Nation’s First 
Anti-Patent Trolling Law, FORBES (May 22, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgold-
man/2013/05/22/vermont-enacts-the-nations-first-anti-patent-trolling-law/ [https://perma.cc/MGB7-
7L77]. 
15. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2014). 
16. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-12A-1 to -7 (2017); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1421 to -1424 
(2019); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-12-101 to -104 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 501.991–.997 (West 2019); 
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-770 to -774 (2017); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-1701 to -1708 (2019); 815 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 505/2SSS (2019); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-11-1-1 to -5-2 (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 50-6,140 (2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1428 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 8701–8702 
(2018); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1601 to -1605 (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 
446.161–.173 (2019); MINN. STAT. §§ 325D.72 (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-351 to -357 (2019); 
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 416.650–.658 (West 2019); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-13-151 to -154 (2019); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 359-M:1–5 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-140 to -145 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§§ 51-36-01 to -08 (2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 111–114 (West 2019); OR. LAWS 2019 ch. 19, 
§ 2; tit. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 6-41.1-1 to -6 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-4-100 to -140 (2019); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-36-1 to -9 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-10-101 to -104 (2019); TEX. BUS. 
& COM. CODE. ANN. §§ 17.951–.955 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1901 to -1905 (2019); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1–.4 (2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE. 
§§ 19.350.005–.900 (2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.197 (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-202 
(2019). 
17. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197 (2014). 
18. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-36-01 to -08 (2019). 
19. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-215.1–.4 (2014). 
20. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197 (West 2018). 
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infringement allegations.21  To achieve this objective, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE 
statute creates a cause of action for “targets”22 against PAEs who fail to meet 
requirements for “patent notifications.”23  In particular, any patent notification 
must include certain information to enable the recipient to make an informed 
decision regarding the claim,24 without including any “false, misleading, or de-
ceptive information.”25  Should a patent notification lack the requisite infor-
mation, a target can request such information, after which a patent holder has 
thirty days to remedy the defective patent notification before facing liability.26  
Importantly, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute makes no distinction between a pa-
tent holder’s good or bad faith in sending a patent notification letter—both good 
and bad faith actors are treated the same.27 
At present, there is very little case law in which Wisconsin’s anti-PAE stat-
ute is asserted, much less adjudicated.28  Two district court opinions, both au-
thored by Chief Judge Griesbach of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, provide 
some insight into the operation of the statute.29  In Great Lakes Mfg. v. Londer-
ville Steel, the patent holder was successful in satisfying the requirements of 
Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute, thus prompting the dismissal of the claim for 
“failure to state a claim.”30  In Energy Bank v. Orion Energy Systems, the 
 
21. Testimony by Rep. Adam Neylon on behalf of the Patent Notification Act: Hearing on SB498 
Before the Committee on Gov’t Ops, Pub. Works, and Telecom, 2013–2014 Legis. (Wis. 2014). 
22. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(1)(b) (West 2018) (defining a “target” as one who satisfies 
Wisconsin’s personal jurisdiction statute under WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1)(b)–(d) and has received 
a patent notification or whose customers have received patent notifications). 
23. Id. § 100.197(1)(a) (“‘Patent notification’ means a letter, e-mail, or other written commu-
nication attempting in any manner to enforce or assert rights in connection with a patent or pending 
patent.”). 
24. See id. §§ 100.197(2)(a), (c). 
25. Id. § 100.197(2)(b). 
26. Id. § 100.197(2)(c). 
27. See infra Part V.A. 
28. Only five federal district court opinions are on record as of March 23, 2019: Sidi Spaces, 
LLC v. CGS Premier, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87316 (D. Az. July 6, 2016) (denying defendant’s 
motion to transfer venue); Sidi Spaces, LLC v. CGS Premier, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96599 (D. 
Az. July 25, 2016) (holding that the patent notification at issue did not attempt to enforce any patent 
right and was thus beyond the scope of WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197); Parallax Grp. Int’l, LLC v. 
Greatmats.com Corp., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183636 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017) (denying as moot 
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim under WIS. STAT. ANN § 100.197 after defend-
ant’s voluntary dismissal of the same); Energy Bank, Inc. v. Orion Energy Sys., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
199795 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 2017) (denying plaintiff’s motion for remand to state court because the 
preemption question constitutes a federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1454); Great Lakes Mfg. v. 
Londerville Steel Enters., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81529 (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2018) (dismissing the 
defendant’s claim under WIS. STAT. ANN § 100.197 for failure to state a claim). 
29. Energy Bank, Inc. v. Orion Energy Sys., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199795 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 
4, 2017); Great Lakes Mfg. v. Londerville Steel Enters., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81529 (E.D. Wis. May 
15, 2018). 
30. Great Lakes Mfg., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81529 at *7.  The court also noted that “nothing 
in the plain language of WIS. STAT. [ANN] § 100.197 imposes a requirement that notification letters 
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plaintiff filed a complaint in state court asserting Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute, 
and the defendant removed to federal court after asserting that Wisconsin’s 
anti-PAE statute was preempted.31  The court declined to remand the case to 
state court after finding that removal was proper on the basis of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction.32  Because the opinion simply denied the motion to remand, 
the case offers no substantive discussion of Wis. Stat. Ann. § 100.197 or 
whether preemption would actually result.33 
In both Great Lakes and Energy Bank, the defendants argued that Wiscon-
sin’s anti-PAE statute was preempted by federal law,34 but both courts resolved 
the cases without directly addressing the issue of preemption.35  As a result, the 
issue of whether Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute is preempted remains an open 
question.  Moreover, the issue of preemption remains an open question for state 
anti-PAE statutes in general. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF PREEMPTION: CAN STATES SUCCESSFULLY DRAFT 
ANTI-PAE LEGISLATION? 
States seeking to take legislative action against PAEs face an obvious 
threshold barrier: the doctrine of federal preemption.  The federal preemption 
doctrine, which finds its roots in the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, operates to prevent states from legislating in areas where Con-
gress possesses the exclusive right to legislate.36  It is well understood that pa-
tent law is exclusively within the domain of the federal government.37  As such, 
any state law aimed at curbing PAEs, or any other patent-related objective for 
 
identify underlying direct infringers” in a patent notification alleging induced infringement under 35 
U.S.C. § 271(b) or “identify which subsection of 35 U.S.C. § 271” is being asserted.  Id. at *10–11; 
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
31. Energy Bank, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199795 at *5. 
32. Id. at *14. 
33. See id. at *13–14. 
34. Id. at *14; Great Lakes Mfg., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81529 at *10. 
35. See Energy Bank, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199795 at *11, *13–14; Great Lakes Mfg., 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81529 at *2. 
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.  Under the Court’s modern preemption doctrine, state legislation 
can be preempted either expressly or impliedly.  See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399–400 
(2012).  A state law is impliedly preempted when Congress creates a legislative scheme that is “so 
pervasive” or “so dominant” in some field that states are unable to legislate.  Id. at 399 (quoting Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  In addition, 
a state law is impliedly preempted when a state law comes into conflict with a federal law so as to 
make it “impossible . .. . . to comply with both state and federal law . .. . . or where state law ‘stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”  
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941)). 
37. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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that matter, is subject to implied preemption.38  Critically, courts have deter-
mined that the Patent Act does not impliedly preempt the entire field of patent 
law, which theoretically leaves states some room to legislate, albeit subject to 
conflict preemption.39 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Likely Preemption Analysis 
The Supreme Court has had an opportunity to address federal preemption 
in the context of patent law on a number of occasions but never in the context 
of anti-PAE statutes.40  The Court’s early jurisprudence, particularly in Allen v. 
Riley, strongly suggests that states may be permitted to “‘enact police regula-
tions for the protection and security of their citizens’ so long as the regulations 
[are] not ‘so great . .. . . as to be regarded as oppressive and unreasona-
ble’ . .. . . [or] interfere with the right of a patentee to sell or assign his pa-
tent . .. . . .”41  In Allen, the Court determined that a Kansas statute requiring 
proof of patent ownership in transactions involving patent rights was a permis-
sible exercise of the state’s police power, despite the fact that the law touched 
on patent rights.42  The Court noted that “[s]ome fair latitude must be allowed 
[to] the states in the exercise of their [police] powers on this subject.”43  In 
particular, states should be allowed to legislate “for the purpose of checking a 
well-known evil . .. . . [such as] fraud and imposition in regard to the sales of 
rights under patents” or for the “safeguarding of the interests of those dealing 
with the assumed owner of a patent . .. . . .”44  Under this reasoning, it would 
seem as though states possess broad discretion to create laws related to patent 
rights.  However, the Supreme Court has not revisited this particular doctrine 
in some time, but at least one scholar persuasively advocates for Allen’s re-
vival.45 
More recently, the Supreme Court assessed conflict preemption of state 
laws touching on federal patent law by asking whether the state law at issue 
 
38. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (“The patent law does not 
explicitly endorse or forbid the operation of trade secret law.”); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic 
Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal patent law plainly does not provide 
for explicit preemption.”); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2012). 
39. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 153 F.3d at 1334–35. 
40. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 472; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 143 (1989); Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1906). 
41. Camilla A. Hrdy, The Reemergence of State Anti-Patent Law, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 133, 
181–82, 183 n. 248 (2018) (quoting Allen, 203 U.S. at 356–57). 
42. See Allen, 203 U.S. at 355. 
43. Id. at 357. 
44. Id. at 356. 
45. Hrdy, supra note 41, at 210–15. 
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conflicts with the purposes of federal patent law.46  More specifically, preemp-
tion is determined after considering whether the “objectives of patent [law]” 
and the state law at issue are in conflict.47  Where the state law “clashes with 
the objectives of . .. . . federal patent laws,” the state law cannot stand.48 
In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Supreme Court first articulated the 
preemption analysis for use in the context of patent law, which was implicitly 
introduced by the Court in its earlier Sears, Roebuck & Co. decision.49  As 
stated by the Kewanee Oil Court, preemption is assessed by examining “the 
objectives of both the patent and [state] laws” to determine whether “the [state] 
scheme of protection . .. . . ’clashes with the objectives of the federal patent 
laws’ . .. . . .  [If the laws clash,] the state law must fall.”50  By this standard, 
the Kewanee Oil Court sought to determine whether Ohio’s trade secret laws 
were preempted by federal patent laws.51  The court stated three purposes of 
patent law: (1) to provide incentive for inventors to invent; (2) to prompt the 
disclosure of inventions; and (3) to ensure that ideas in the public domain stay 
there.52  After then examining the purpose of trade secret law, specifically its 
aim to encourage invention and maintain standards of commercial ethics, the 
Court held that Ohio’s trade secret law did not conflict with the three purposes 
of patent law because it primarily served those inventions that were either not 
patentable subject matter or would constitute inventions of “dubious” patenta-
bility.53  Thus, Ohio’s trade secret law survived preemption.54 
In a second case, Bonito Boats, Inc v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., the Su-
preme Court built upon Kewanee Oil Co.’s preemption analysis by arguably 
adding a fourth purpose of patent law: “to promote national uniformity in the 
realm of intellectual property.”55  In considering this fourth purpose, the Court 
found a Florida law that prohibited the use of a “direct molding process to 
 
46. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479–80 (1974); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989). 
47. Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480. 
48. Id. at 480 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). 
49. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480. 
50. Id. (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 231). 
51. Id. at 478. 
52. Id. at 480–81. 
53. See id. at 484, 491.  Though both federal patent law and Ohio’s trade secret law seek to 
encourage invention, the Court found that patent law’s policy “is not disturbed by the existence of 
another form of incentive to invent[].”  Id. at 484. 
54. Id. at 493.  It is worth noting that the Kewanee Oil Co. decision has been broadly criticized, 
particularly for its assertion that inventors elect for patent protection over trade secret protection.  Rich-
ard H. Stern, A Reexamination of Preemption of Trade Secret Law After Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 927, 946 (2017). 
55. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989); Paul R. Gug-
liuzza, Patent Trolls and Preemption, 101 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1605 (2015). 
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duplicate unpatented boat hulls” was preempted because it “substantially re-
strict[ed] the public’s ability to exploit an [unpatented design] . .. . . .”56  In par-
ticular, the Florida law prevented individuals from making use of unpatented 
designs, which, according to federal patent law, exist in the public domain.57  
Accordingly, the Florida law “erod[ed] the general rule of free [nationwide] 
competition upon which the attractiveness of the federal patent bargain de-
pends”58 by “constricting the spectrum of useful public knowledge”59 and “of-
fering patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the present 
federal scheme . .. . . .”60  In offering protection beyond that of the federal pa-
tent scheme, the Florida law disrupted the national uniformity of patent protec-
tion and its corresponding scope.61 
B.  The Federal Circuit’s “Bad Faith” Preemption Standard 
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen or its more recent guidance 
in Kewanee Oil Co. and Bonito Boats, Inc., the Federal Circuit has developed 
its own preemption doctrine.  In the context of patent law, the Federal Circuit’s 
preemption standard, which is articulated in the Globetrotter opinion, finds 
much of its root in the First Amendment’s Petition Clause and the Supreme 
Court’s Noerr Motor Freight decision.62  Rather than comparing the objectives 
of patent law with the state law as the Supreme Court did in Kewanee Oil Co. 
and Bonito Boats, the Federal Circuit fashioned a test that preempts state law 
claims made against a patent holder, unless a party can show that: (1) the patent 
holder’s infringement allegation is made in bad faith and (2) that the allegations 
were made with knowledge or reckless disregard of their inaccuracy.63 
The Federal Circuit’s emphasis on bad faith originated in its Hunter Doug-
las decision, where the court stated that “federal patent law bars the imposition 
of liability for publicizing a patent in the marketplace unless a plaintiff can 
 
56. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 141, 167. 
57. Id. at 167 (“The Florida statute is aimed directly at the promotion of intellectual creation by 
substantially restricting the public’s ability to exploit ideas that the patent system mandates shall be 
free for all to use.”); Johnson, supra note 7, at 2040. 
58. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 161. 
59. Id. at 159. 
60. Id. at 142. 
61. Id. at 162–63. 
62. See Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (citing E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)).  In Globe-
trotter, a state tortious interference claim based on allegations of patent infringement claim was 
deemed preempted by federal law in part because the law imposed liability for a patent holder’s “good 
faith” conduct in asserting patent rights.  Id. at 1374. 
63. See id. at 1377. 
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show that the patentholder acted in bad faith.”64  Accordingly, “if the plaintiff 
were to fail to allege that the defendant patentholder was guilty of . .. . . bad 
faith in the publication of a patent, then the complaint would be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because of federal 
preemption.”65  After the Hunter Douglas decision, the Federal Circuit contin-
ued to place primary emphasis on bad faith conduct of a patent holder,66 and 
eventually, the first prong of the test became the most important. 
The first prong is important because it effectively immunizes patent holders 
from any state law action67 arising out of the patent holder’s effort to enforce a 
patent except when it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the patent 
holder’s enforcement allegation is made in bad faith.68  Within the first prong, 
the Federal Circuit has imposed an objective baselessness requirement that is 
of great consequence in the preemption inquiry: to show bad faith, a party must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the patent holder’s allegations 
were objectively baseless such that there is “no reasonable basis” to believe that 
that the patent holder could succeed on the allegation.69  Under the Federal Cir-
cuit’s bad faith standard, then, a state law is preempted by a patent holder’s 
immunity from claims that are not founded in bad faith such that there is no 
reasonable basis to believe that the allegation could succeed. 
As alluded to above, the objective baseless threshold for a showing of bad 
faith does not originate from the Supremacy Clause, the Intellectual Property 
Clause, or any case law implicating either doctrine.70  Instead, the Federal Cir-
cuit admits that it is derived from the “jurisprudential background of the bad 
 
64. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  The 
Court also noted one cannot be held liable for conduct before the patent and trademark office “unless 
a plaintiff can show that the patentholder’s conduct amounted to fraud or rendered the patent applica-
tion process a sham.”  Id. at 1335. 
65. Id. at 1336. 
66. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[U]nder the 
Hunter Douglas analysis, . .. . . bad faith must be alleged and ultimately proven, even if bad faith is 
not otherwise an element of the [state law] claim.”); Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  A plaintiff, to further state law claims regarding patent enforcement, must 
“present[] clear and convincing evidence that the infringement allegations are objectively false, and 
that the patentee made them in bad faith, viz., with knowledge of their incorrectness or falsity, or dis-
regard for either, the statements are actionable and are not protected by the existence of a patent.”  
Golan, 310 F.3d at 1371. 
67. And arguably federal causes of action as well.  Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1586. 
68. Globetrotter Software, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1374 (“State-law claims . .. . . can survive federal 
preemption only to the extent that those claims are based on a showing of ‘bad faith’ action in asserting 
infringement.  Accordingly, to avoid preemption, ‘bad faith must be alleged and ultimately proven, 
even if bad faith is not otherwise an element of the tort claim.’” (quoting Zenith Elecs., 182 F.3d at 
1355)). 
69. Id. at 1377 (quoting Golan, 310 F.3d at 1371). 
70. Id. at 1377. 
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faith standard” provided by the Supreme Court’s Noerr decision.71  While the 
Noerr decision pertains to antitrust law, the Federal Circuit has imported the 
doctrine into patent law to permit plaintiffs to invoke immunity over state law 
claims.72  The Globetrotter court stated that this standard “rests on both federal 
preemption and the First Amendment,”73 but this bad faith standard is plainly 
derived from Noerr and its progeny.74  Indeed, according to some scholars, the 
court’s reliance on Noerr represents the “equat[ion of] bad faith with conflict 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause,” though the two doctrines are dis-
tinct.75 
The Globetrotter court focused on bad faith as a permissible area for state 
regulation because federal patent law stops short of regulating in this area.76  
Patent law instead immunizes patent holders making good faith assertions of 
patent rights from civil liability for those arising out of those assertions while 
leaving all bad faith assertions of patent rights exposed to other civil liability, 
including liability under state law.77  The fact that federal patent law only ex-
tends immunity over such good faith assertions theoretically provides space for 
states to create causes of action to be asserted against bad faith patent holders 
without creating any conflict with federal law.78  However, as some scholars 
note, this space is so narrow so as to “render[] the states practically powerless 
to regulate patent enforcement . .. . . .”79  Moreover, other scholars have noted 
that this is likely not the only space states have to operate according to Supreme 
Court decisions.80 
On its face, the Federal Circuit’s focus on bad faith assertions might seem 
workable for states seeking to regulate PAEs’ troll-esque behavior, a kind of 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 1376; Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1585 n. 41. 
73. Globetrotter Software, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1377. 
74. See id. at 1374.  The objective baselessness standard used by the Golan and Globetrotter 
courts comes from the Supreme Court’s Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. decision which defines ob-
jective baselessness as it relates to the “sham” litigation exception to anti-trust immunity under Noerr.  
Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 51, 60 (1993) (“[T]he 
lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect 
success on the merits.”); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1616. 
75. Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1624; Hrdy, supra note 41, at 201. 
76. Globetrotter Software, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1374–75. 
77. Johnson, supra note 7, at 2044; see also Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 
153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1617. 
78. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“In [Hunter 
Douglas,] we opined that there is no conflict-type preemption of various state law claims based on 
publicizing an allegedly invalid and unenforceable patent in the marketplace as long as the claimant 
can show that the patent holder acted in bad faith in publication of the patent.” (emphasis added)). 
79. Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1608. 
80. Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 353 (1906) (“[T]he patent laws do not prevent the state from 
enacting police regulations for the protection and security of its citizens . .. . . .” (quoting Mason v. 
McLeod, 57 Kan. 105, 109 (Kan. 1896))); Hrdy, supra note 41, at 181–83. 
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behavior that could surely be categorized as “bad faith” in lay terms.  However, 
the Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard operates according to bad faith as de-
fined by the Court in Noerr; a higher standard of bad faith is required.81  Under 
this definition of bad faith, it does not matter whether a PAE’s conduct is ma-
licious, deceptive, or harassing.82  Instead, all that matters is whether the claim 
is objectively baseless with no reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.83  
This bad faith standard is, according to multiple critics, a very high standard 
that is nearly insurmountable for those facing the typical PAE claim.84  Because 
the standard is so high, states’ ability to regulate is effectively minimized. 
III.  ANALYSIS: PREEMPTION THE STATES’ ANTI-PAE LEGISLATION 
The issue of preemption in the context of recent anti-PAE statutes has been 
examined by a number of scholars.85  To date, no anti-PAE statute has made its 
way to the Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit to confirm scholarly predic-
tions regarding preemption.  Thus, until the preemption issue is determined by 
either or both courts, the outcome of a preemption analysis is left unanswered.  
Of course, scholars have opined on the likelihood of preemption at length.86 
Some commenters have suggested that, under the Supreme Court’s Allen or 
Kewanee Oil Co. and Bonito Boats preemption framework, state laws regulat-
ing the enforcement of intellectual property rights, such as the states’ anti-PAE 
statutes, are unlikely to be preempted.87  Indeed, a strong argument can be made 
that state anti-PAE statutes do not “clash with the objectives of federal patent 
law” and thus should survive preemption under the Kewanee/Bonito Boats 
standard.88  Average inventors are unlikely to forgo patent protection out of fear 
of being sued by some state law regulating bad faith or deceptive enforcement.89  
The anti-PAE statutes are not unlike state trade secret, trademark, and unfair 
 
81. Globetrotter Software, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1377 (citing Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc., 310 
F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
82. See id. (“Our decision to permit state-law tort liability for only objectively baseless allega-
tions of infringement rests on both federal preemption and the First Amendment.” (emphasis added)). 
83. Id. 
84. See Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1608; Roger Allan Ford, The Uneasy Case for Patent 
Federalism, 217 WIS. L. REV. 551, 567 (2017). 
85. See, e.g., Jonathan Todd, Stopping the Troll Tax: An Analysis of the Patent Troll Issue and 
South Carolina’s Bad Faith Assertion of Patent Infringement Act, 68 S.C. L. REV. 761, 784–88 (2017); 
Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1631–35; Johnson, supra note 7, at 2051–68; Ford, supra note 84, at 561–
68; Hrdy, supra note 41, at 187–97. 
86. See, e.g., Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1605–08, 1631–35; Johnson, supra note 7, at 2051–
70; Todd, supra note 85, at 786–91; T. Christian Langreth, The Fight Against “Patent Trolls”: Will 
State Law Come to the Rescue?, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 100, 120–25 (2014). 
87. Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1601, 1608 (suggesting that states might have authority to 
enact anti-PAE statutes under the Kewanee/Bonito Boats preemption standard). 
88. Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1605–06. 
89. See id. at 1605. 
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competition laws that permissibly occupy a domain related to but separate from 
federal patent law.90  To be sure, state law operates to determine ownership of 
patents through contract law,91 discourage the abuse of process,92 and prohibit 
business disparagement.93  For this reason, most state anti-PAE statutes do not 
disincentivize invention or disclosure in the way that Kewanee and Bonito 
Boats Courts were concerned.  Indeed, these anti-PAE statutes arguably do not 
concern the scope of intellectual property that was at issue in Bonito Boats, 
Inc.94  Instead, the anti-PAE statutes at issue simply regulate “well-known 
evils,” like the emergence of patent trolls, without expanding or diminishing 
the scope of any patent right.95 
However, given the current Federal Circuit stance on the matter, any sug-
gestion that these state laws would survive the Supreme Court’s likely preemp-
tion analysis is of little practical importance.96  This is because the Federal Cir-
cuit’s drastically different approach to preemption in the context of patent law 
has made it “exceedingly difficult”97 and “almost impossible”98 for state laws 
related to patent rights to stand.  And various scholars have specifically sug-
gested that anti-PAE statutes are unlikely to survive the Federal Circuit’s bad 
faith preemption analysis.99  In particular, many of the anti-PAE statutes are 
susceptible to preemption because they define bad faith differently than the 
Federal Circuit.100  And other anti-PAE statutes may be preempted by failing to 
 
90. Id. at 1605–06.  The same can be said for the Ohio trade secret law scheme.  See Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484–90 (1974). 
91. See, e.g., Enovsys LLC v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 614 F.3d 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
92. See, e.g., Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
93. See, e.g., Additive Controls & Measurement Sys. Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 478 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Patent law does not create [the plaintiff’s] state law business disparagement 
claim. .. . . .  [But the plaintiff’s] ‘right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial ques-
tion of federal patent law . .. . . .’” (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 
809 (1988))). 
94. Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1606. 
95. Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347, 356 (1906); see also Gugliuzza, supra note 55 at 1606 (“When 
the Court has been confronted with bodies of state law . .. . . that govern intellectual property rights 
whose scope has already been determined by federal law, the Court has allowed state law room to 
operate.”). 
96. Id. at 1608. 
97. See Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1616–17. 
98. See id. at 1627. 
99. Ford, supra note 84, at 561–62 n. 44; Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1631–35; Johnson, supra 
note 7, at 2061–70 (noting that many of Vermont’s provisions would be preempted under the Federal 
Circuit’s standard). 
100. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 2061–70. 
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limit the operation to bad faith conduct and imposing liability for those seeking 
to enforce patents in good faith.101 
Almost all state anti-PAE statutes are directed towards bad faith, presuma-
bly in an effort to avoid preemption under the Federal Circuit’s bad faith stand-
ard.102  Commenters suggest that those states that have drafted anti-PAE stat-
utes directed towards bad faith as the Federal Circuit has defined it may survive 
the Federal Circuit’s stringent bad faith standard.103  Indeed, by tailoring a state 
law to operate only on the narrow grounds provided by the federal circuit’s bad 
faith standard, states theoretically have room to legislate.  As some scholars 
have suggested, however, avoiding preemption may not be the only problem 
for those seeking relief under state bad faith-oriented anti-PAE statutes: the re-
quirement that a plaintiff show objective baselessness by clear and convincing 
evidence is a high barrier to surmount.104  For instance, proving the objective 
baselessness of a claim is often a highly factual inquiry, one very likely to be 
intertwined with the merits of the infringement claim and the underlying patent 
itself.105  This suggests that parties seeking remedy under bad faith-oriented 
anti-PAE statutes face a difficult legal battle with undoubtedly high legal fees, 
which may render the assertion of anti-PAE statutes as cumbersome as simply 
defending against the infringement allegation or paying the PAE’s desired set-
tlement fee.106  Not all statutes address bad faith, however.  Wisconsin’s anti-
PAE statute, for example, notably makes no mention of bad faith conduct what-
soever.107 
A.  Wisconsin’s Anti-PAE Statute is Likely Preempted Under the Federal 
Circuit’s Standard but Likely Not Under the Supreme Court’s Standard 
Should the Supreme Court consider this particular preemption issue using 
either the approach from Allen or Kewanee/Bonito Boats, it is likely that Wis-
consin’s anti-PAE statute would survive.  Under Allen, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE 
statute seems to be a clear exercise of police power aimed at remedying the 
“well-known evil” of PAEs, forcing potential infringers into costly settlements 
by sending harassing letters.  Indeed, the patent holder needs to prove 
 
101. Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 361 F.3d 1367, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); see also Todd, supra note 85, at 788–91. 
102. Further evidence of this is shown by states’ reference to standards that appear similar to 
the Federal Circuit’s “objective baselessness” standard.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(b)(6) 
(2014) (“The . .. . . assertion of patent infringement is meritless . .. . . .”). 
103. See, e.g., Langreth, supra note 86, at 120–25. 
104. See Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1635. 
105. Id. 
106. This begs the question: is it even worth litigating an anti-PAE case?  See The Patent Troll 
Problem, LOTNETWORK, https://lotnet.com/the-patent-troll-problem [https://perma.cc/2GQL-54AW]. 
107. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2018). 
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ownership to satisfy Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute, just like the Kansas law at 
issue in Allen.  Under the Kewanee Oil Co. and Bonito Boats approach, Wis-
consin’s anti-PAE statute is also likely to survive preemption.  By requiring a 
patent holder to comply with demand letter requirements, Wisconsin’s anti-
PAE statute does not discourage invention, discourage the prompt disclosure of 
said inventions, or keep ideas from the public domain in any meaningful way.  
Nor does the law inhibit the uniform application of patent laws; substantive 
patent law is unchanged by the operation of Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute. 
Nonetheless, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute is likely preempted under the 
Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard precisely because the statute is not limited 
to bad faith conduct.  By imposing liability for infringement allegations that are 
merely “false, misleading, or deceptive,”108 the Wisconsin anti-PAE statute the-
oretically regulates good faith conduct by the Federal Circuit’s definition,109 
which, according to the Federal Circuit, justifies preemption.110  Though 
“false,” “misleading,” and “deceptive” are adjectives that could be used to de-
scribe conduct of many PAEs, these adjectives are nowhere to be found within 
the Federal Circuit’s Noerr-derived objective baselessness requirement.  Even 
though regulating false, misleading, or deceptive conduct is particularly desir-
able in the age of PAEs, the states are precluded from regulating in this area by 
the Federal Circuit’s current preemption standard.  It only matters whether the 
patent holder’s enforcement claim is objectively baseless according to the 
Noerr definition articulated in the Globetrotter case,111 and this standard leaves 
scant opportunity for states to curb unwelcome PAE behavior. 
The Wisconsin statute is vulnerable to preemption under the Federal Cir-
cuit’s bad faith standard by theoretically imposing liability on good faith con-
duct when enforcement letters lack the information required by Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 100.197(2)(c).112  It is entirely possible that a patent holder could assert her 
patent rights in good faith but fail to provide an enforcement letter with the 
requisite information and subsequently fail to remedy the deficiency.  Though 
it is advantageous to enable recipients to respond intelligently to an enforce-
ment letter by ensuring patent enforcement letters contain adequate information 
 
108. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2018). 
109. At least one scholar has noted that Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute is perhaps more vulner-
able to preemption on this basis than other states’ anti-PAE legislation.  See Gugliuzza, supra note 55, 
at 1631–32. 
110. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., 362 F.3d 1367, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
111. See Globetrotter Software, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1376–77 (citing Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, 
Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
112. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2018). 
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without regard for the good or bad faith nature of the allegation,113 this require-
ment necessarily affects patent holders acting on both good and bad faith.  Thus, 
when bad faith is the definite limit on a state’s ability to regulate matters related 
to patent law, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute is almost certainly preempted by 
imposing liability for good faith conduct of patent holders. 
Because of its likely preemption, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute demon-
strates the way in which the Federal Circuit’s preemption standard greatly re-
stricts states’ ability to protect their constituents from PAEs.  More specifically, 
Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute makes a conscious effort to avoid any conflict 
with the merits of patent law by carefully regulating only the content of the 
enforcement letter.  To satisfy the statute, no inquiry into the merits of the patent 
claim is necessary.  Patent holders truly acting in good faith can easily avoid 
liability by complying with the statute’s requirements.  State judges or district 
court judges can comfortably weigh the merits of a claim under Wisconsin’s 
anti-PAE statute without any searching inquiry into substantive patent law.  The 
same cannot be said of the Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard, which plainly 
requires an objective baselessness as to the merits of the underlying infringe-
ment claim. 
Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute is preempted because it operates beyond the 
narrow circumstances defined by bad faith.  However, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE 
statute seemingly operates beyond the bounds of bad faith precisely in an effort 
to avoid the merits of patent law.  In this way, the Federal Circuit’s standard 
preempts carefully constructed state laws and thus frustrates states’ efforts to 
protect their constituents in a way that avoids any unnecessary wading into sub-
stantive patent law. 
B.  Jurisdictional Implications and the Conundrum for State Legislators 
One important implication of the Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard is that 
it necessarily requires state laws to operate within the merits of the patent in-
fringement allegation and the underlying patent, which are substantive patent 
law issues, and therefore, under the federal judiciary’s exclusive jurisdiction.114  
To be sure, because bad faith is characterized by a patent holder’s assertion of 
infringement that is objectively baseless according to the merits (or rather the 
lack thereof) of the infringement allegation, courts necessarily need to rule on 
 
113. See Testimony by Rep. Adam Neylon on behalf of the Patent Notification Act: Hearing on 
SB498 Before the Committee on Gov’t Ops, Pub. Works, and Telecom, supra note 21. 
114. The federal judiciary has original jurisdiction over issues arising under Acts of Congress 
related to patent law.  28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).  For actions first filed in state court, litigants are 
permitted to remove to federal court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) jurisdiction.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1454(a) (2012). 
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the matters of substantive patent law.115  In particular, a court would need to 
consider both the scope of the underlying patent claims116 and the validity117 of 
the underlying patent as it relates to the likelihood that the infringement will 
succeed.118  It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a state court could find 
bad faith on the part of a patent holder based on an objectively baseless claim 
without considering the merits of the infringement suit and the underlying pa-
tent(s). 
By requiring states to regulate only the narrowly defined bad faith of patent 
holders, the Federal Circuit has created a conundrum for state legislators seek-
ing to exercise police powers to protect their constituents from PAEs’ harass-
ment.  On the one hand, states could predictably survive the current Federal 
Circuit preemption by narrowly regulating only bad faith claims but face certain 
removal to the federal court system under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1454(a).  This choice leaves states without the ability to provide a friendly 
forum to their constituents, which further limits states power to protect their 
constituents even if an anti-PAE statute could survive preemption.  On the other 
hand, a state could theoretically steer clear of substantive patent law and asso-
ciated jurisdictional consequences by creating a cause of action that does not 
operate according to substantive patent law but then face sure preemption under 
the Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard by regulating good faith conduct. 
Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute chooses the latter course and avoids manda-
tory removal by omitting any inquiry to the merits of the infringement claim or 
the underlying patent.  Thus, it would seem that Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute 
may successfully remain in state court under current 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) case 
law.119  Until the preemption question is addressed by a court, however, Wis-
consin’s anti-PAE statute, and other anti-PAE statues for that matter, may con-
tinue to face removal until the preemption question is resolved.120 
 
115. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (“Victory in an in-
fringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s product or pro-
cess,’ which in turn necessitates a determination of ‘what the words in the claim mean.’” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
116. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
117. This point would likely be of particular relevance because many PAE assertions are based 
on broad patents that are suspect on 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112 bases.  See 157 CONG. REC. 717 (2011) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy). 
118. See Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1635. 
119. See Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (noting that when a claim does not “raise 
a . .. . . federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,” the claim does not fall under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338(a) jurisdiction) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 
U.S. 308, 314 (2005))). 
120. See, e.g., Energy Bank, Inc. v. Orion Energy Sys., 2017 LEXIS 199795, at *12–14 (E.D. 
Wis. Dec. 4, 2017). 
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Thus, while Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute makes an effort to fall outside of 
the limited scope permitted by the Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard, it re-
mains unclear whether litigants will be permitted to bring their claims in state 
court.  The consequences of bringing a claim in federal courts could be dire: 
federal district courts are bound by the Federal Circuit’s precedent, including 
its bad faith preemption standard.  Thus, if a judge finds that the preemption 
issue does, in fact, confer exclusive federal jurisdiction, it is highly likely that 
the adjudication of the preemption issue would result in the preemption of Wis-
consin’s anti-PAE statute. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute is very likely preempted 
under the Federal Circuit’s current bad faith standard.121  For its “nearly insur-
mountable requirements,” this doctrine has been sharply criticized by scholars 
as it relates to state anti-PAE statutes generally.122  In addition to these criti-
cisms, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute and its likely preemption highlight the 
counterintuitive operation of the Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard: encour-
aging state laws to operate according to the merits of substantive patent law 
claims. 
Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute demonstrates a clear effort on the part of the 
Wisconsin legislature to avoid conflicting with federal patent law by eliminat-
ing the need for any inquiry into the merits of the patent.123  In this way, Wis-
consin’s anti-PAE statute is unique relative to other anti-PAE statutes.  While 
other states direct their statutes to the bad faith of patent holders,124 Wisconsin’s 
anti-PAE statute places its emphasis on the contents of the patent notification 
letter beyond the merits of an infringement claim.125  By avoiding the merits of 
the patent, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute provides relief for its constituents 
while respecting Congress’s exclusive purview over substantive patent law.126  
Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute, therefore, serves Wisconsin citizens in response 
to a deficiency in federal patent law127 while simultaneously appreciating Wis-
consin’s limits vis-á-vis Congress’s authority and exclusive federal jurisdiction. 
 
121. See supra Part V.A. 
122. Gugliuzza, supra note 55, at 1585, 1628–35; Hrdy, supra note 41, at 210–15. 
123. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2018). 
124. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4197(a) (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-215.2 A. (2014); 
14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8701 2. (2018). 
125. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2018). 
126. This arguably encourages uniformity of patent law, an important purpose of patent law 
according to the Court in Bonito Boats.  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
162 (1989). 
127. Johnson, supra note 7, at 2053–54. 
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Unfortunately, Wisconsin’s anti-PAE statute likely falls victim to the Fed-
eral Circuit’s chokehold on state laws relating to patent enforcement precisely 
by its effort to avoid substantive patent law.  Meanwhile, other states’ anti-PAE 
statutes generally implicate the same substantive patent law issues that Wiscon-
sin’s anti-PAE statute avoids in order to survive preemption but only when 
brought in federal court.  By requiring costly litigation in federal court, plain-
tiffs would soon face steep litigation costs, which may quickly make plaintiffs’ 
costs of asserting an anti-PAE statute exceed the cost to simply settle with 
PAEs. 
The Federal Circuit’s bad faith requirement for state legislation, therefore, 
serves to quell the states’ abilities to regulate PAEs’ behavior and secures the 
PAEs’ ability to continue their harassing behavior.  Because of the harsh and 
absurd consequences derived from the Federal Circuit’s bad faith standard, the 
Supreme Court should weigh in and replace the Federal Circuit’s bad faith 
preemption standard with either its Allen or Kewanee Oil Co. and Bonito Boats 
standard. 
 
